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I. INTRODUCTION
The titles of property purchased at tax sales are currently “under a federally
created cloud” 1 because there is not a universally applied standard to determine
whether tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 2 As a result, it remains uncertain and difficult to predict
whether tax sales may or may not be avoided because tax sales may be avoided
if they are not for “reasonably equivalent value.” This “federally created cloud”
raises the issue of whether there should be a presumption that lawfully conducted
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 548, similar to the presumption provided in the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation “that
‘reasonably equivalent value’ is the price received at [a mortgage] foreclosure
sale, so long as all of the requirements of the state’s foreclosure laws have been
complied with.” 3 The courts are increasingly split on this issue.
The lack of a universally applied standard to determine whether tax sales are
for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
causes uncertainty and other negative effects, including causing harm to the
general welfare of society and states’ interests by significantly reducing the
security of the title to real estate obtained through tax sales. 4 Therefore, there
should be a presumption created by the courts in applying 11 U.S.C. § 548 that
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” when the tax sale in question
meets the following four elements: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure, strict
adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding. Another solution
is for the courts to apply BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation to tax sales.
Specifically, the courts should rule that, like in BFP, a “reasonably equivalent
value” for property is the price in fact received at the forced sale, including tax
sales, so long as all the requirements of the state’s forced sale laws have been
complied with. 5
Part two of this Note discusses § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which sets
forth the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid fraudulent transfers. Then,
part three explains tax sales and the different procedures of tax sales employed
in different jurisdictions. Part four discusses BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corporation, a landmark case where the United States Supreme Court held that
mortgage foreclosure sales may not be avoided if the sale complied with the

1. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (emphasis added).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
3. David P. Schwartz, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation: Critiquing the Supreme Court’s
Method of Determining “Reasonably Equivalent Value” Within the Context of Bankruptcy
Foreclosures, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 345, 363 (1995).
4. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 544.
5. See id. at 545; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
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state’s foreclosure laws. 6 Next, part five discusses the definition of “value” in §
548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Part six discusses the circuit split regarding
whether tax sales can be avoided. In part seven, this Note discusses the negative
effects caused by the lack of a universally applied standard to determine whether
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value.” Finally, in parts eight and nine,
this Note suggests potential solutions to address these negative effects, including
applying BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation to tax sales, or adopting a
presumption that the prices received at tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent
value” based on four elements.
II. SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
“Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548, sets forth the powers
of a trustee in bankruptcy (or, in a Chapter 11 case, a debtor in possession) to
avoid fraudulent transfers.” 7 Section 548 permits the bankruptcy trustee to avoid
transfers of property made within two years of the debtor’s filing of bankruptcy
which were made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor or
which were constructively fraudulent. 8 Further, transfers of property are
considered constructively fraudulent and can be avoided if
the trustee can establish (1) that the debtor had an interest in property; (2) that a
transfer of that interest occurred within [two] year[s] of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition; (3) that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer
or became insolvent as a result thereof; and (4) that the debtor received “less
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer.” 9

6. 511 U.S. at 545.
7. Id. at 535 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012)). Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code provides
in pertinent part:
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an
insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment
contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the
date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or
obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation . . .
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
8. Id.
9. BFP, 511 U.S. at 535 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012)).
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III. TAX SALES
Delinquent property taxes are collected through tax sales. 10 Generally, once
property taxes are declared delinquent, most jurisdictions permit a private third
party to purchase the local government’s lien for the taxes due at a tax sale. 11
The transfer of the tax lien is distinct from the sale of the underlying property
that occurs at a tax foreclosure sale, which is another type of tax sale that this
Note addresses. 12 “Instead, what is transferred is the lien itself, vesting in the
purchaser the right to enforce the lien in accordance with statutory
procedures.” 13
“While all jurisdictions recognize a lien for property taxes, and all provide
some mechanism for enforcement of that lien, the similarities end at that
point.” 14 A small amount of jurisdictions “functionally recognize a form of
‘strict foreclosure’ in which a final date is established for payment of the taxes,
and upon nonpayment the property is conveyed to the government” without a
public or private sale. 15 Alternatively, “in the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions enforcement of the property tax lien involves a sale of the lien itself,
or of the underlying property, or sequential sales of first the lien and then the
property.” 16 In the jurisdictions that enforce the property tax lien with “one
public sale, the sale is a sale of the underlying property, though the sale may be
followed by a statutory right of redemption which requires subsequent
termination by the passage of time or by affirmative action by the purchaser at
the initial sale.” 17 Alternatively, “[j]urisdictions that recognize two separate
sales are first selling the lien, which is then enforced by a subsequent foreclosure
sale.” 18
Furthermore, the public sale of a tax lien, or sale of the property itself, is
conducted in three different ways, depending on the jurisdiction. 19 “The
predominant approach” is offering “the property at a public auction to the
highest bidder, with a minimum bid equal to the aggregate amount of delinquent
taxes, interest, penalties, and costs.” 20 If the sale price exceeds the minimum bid,
“the surplus is held for the benefit of subordinate claimants and the original
owner.” 21 In a minority of jurisdictions, the public auction is conducted by
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 760 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 772.
Alexander, supra note 10, at 772.
Id.
Id. at 773.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Alexander, supra note 10, at 774.
Id.
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awarding the property to the purchaser who is willing to purchase the smallest
percentage of undivided interest in the real property. 22 “[F]our states sell the
property to the purchaser offering the lowest effective rate of interest pending
redemption of the property by the owner[,]” in an effort to reflect market
conditions and interest rates. 23
If a debtor files for bankruptcy shortly after a tax foreclosure, the debtor’s
creditors become interested in avoiding the tax sale to recover lost wealth for the
estate. 24 The trustee can characterize the tax sale “as a constructive fraud, made
while the debtor was insolvent, and for ‘less than a reasonably equivalent value
in exchange.’” 25 If this argument prevails, the tax sale is avoided, and the estate
recovers the property. 26 The tax creditor would still retain a lien against the
property for the amount of the tax debt, however, the tax creditor would lose to
the estate the difference between the value of the property and the tax debt. 27
This Note addresses whether lawfully conducted tax sales, as described above,
are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 548.
IV. BFP V. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, the United States Supreme Court
considered the issue of
whether the consideration received from a noncollusive, real estate mortgage
foreclosure sale conducted in conformance with applicable state law
conclusively satisfies the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that transfers of
property by insolvent debtors within one year prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition be in exchange for “a reasonably equivalent value.” 28

The petitioner in BFP “took title to a California home subject to a deed of trust
in favor of Imperial Savings Association.” 29 “After the petitioners were unable
to continue payments and the loan was in default, the home was purchased for
$433,000 at a properly conducted foreclosure sale” on July 12, 1989. 30
Later, in October 1989, the petitioner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. 31 “Acting as a debtor in possession, the petitioner filed
a complaint in Bankruptcy Court to set aside the conveyance of the home . . . on
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Marie T. Reilly, The Case for the Tax Collector, 18 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 627,
628 (Nov. 2009).
25. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012)).
26. Reilly, supra note 24, at 628.
27. Id.
28. 511 U.S. 531, 533 (1994) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2012)).
29. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 362 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 533).
30. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 362; BFP, 511 U.S. at 533–34.
31. BFP, 511 U.S. at 534.
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the grounds that the foreclosure sale constituted a fraudulent transfer under §
548.” 32 The petitioner alleged that the home was worth more than $725,000 at
the time of the foreclosure sale, “and, thus, was not exchanged for a ‘reasonably
equivalent value’ under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.” 33 “The
bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the purchaser[,]” and “[t]he
bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the dismissal, holding that consideration
received in a non-collusive and regularly conducted, nonjudicial foreclosure sale
establishes ‘reasonably equivalent value’ as a matter of law.” 34 The court of
appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court reviewed the decision,
holding “that ‘reasonably equivalent value’ is the price received at the
foreclosure sale, so long as all of the requirements of the state’s foreclosure laws
have been complied with.” 35
In BFP, the Court had to interpret the phrase “reasonably equivalent value”
in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to determine whether the transfer of property
in that case could be avoided as constructively fraudulent. 36 The other elements
of § 548 were not at issue before the Court in BFP. 37 In interpreting § 548, the
Court stated that “of the three critical terms ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ only
the last is defined: ‘value’ means, for purposes of § 548, ‘property, or satisfaction
or securing of a . . . debt of the debtor.’” 38 The Court stated that “‘reasonably
equivalent value’ is not to be equated either with fair market value or with fair
foreclosure price.” 39 Instead, the Court concluded that “a ‘reasonably equivalent
value’ for foreclosed property[] is the price in fact received at the foreclosure
sale, so long as all the requirements of the State’s foreclosure law have been
complied with.” 40 “Tax foreclosure sale statutes are often comparable to
mortgage foreclosure sale statutes,” and as a result, “by analogy, BFP is
arguably applicable to tax foreclosure sales.” 41 “However, because the Supreme
Court expressly noted that BFP did not necessarily apply to tax foreclosures, the
applicability of BFP to tax foreclosures has been somewhat inconsistent and
largely dependent on the protections afforded by applicable state tax foreclosure
law.” 42 This Note will provide clarification on the issue of whether lawfully

32. Id.
33. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 362–63 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 534).
34. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 363.
35. Id.
36. 511 U.S. at 535; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
37. 511 U.S. at 535.
38. Id. at 535–36 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (2012)).
39. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 346.
40. BFP, 511 U.S. at 545; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
41. John T. Gregg, A Federally Created Cloud: Reasonable Equivalent Value and Present
Fair Equivalent Value in Tax Foreclosures and Forfeitures, 2007 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR.
L., PART II (Sept. 2007).
42. Id.
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conducted tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance
pursuant to § 548.
V. DEFINING “VALUE” IN SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
As mentioned earlier, in BFP, the United States Supreme Court was tasked
with interpreting the ambiguous phrase “reasonably equivalent value” in 11
U.S.C. § 548. 43 The Court focused on the word “value,” as “[t]his [was] the word
that Justice Scalia and the majority found to be ambiguous.” 44
“Congress used the word ‘value’ throughout the [Bankruptcy] Code to
enable the bankruptcy judge to select different values for different purposes,”
and thus “a fixed meaning [of ‘value’] was just what Congress wished to
avoid.” 45 The Court in BFP, however, held that the term “value” was ambiguous
and set out to define it, and the Court searched outside the Bankruptcy Code for
the definition of “value,” “utiliz[ing] history and interpretative ‘rules’ to find
that the ‘value’ should be based on the individual state law’s foreclosure-sale
market.” 46 Therefore,
the price paid at the foreclosure-sale market, which is controlled by varying state
laws, will always be equivalent to the value of the property taken by the creditor.
As a result, foreclosure sales complying with state law can never be fraudulent
transfers. Because the mortgagee is frequently the purchaser at its own
foreclosure, the amount of the mortgage debt will create the price ceiling under
most state laws. 47

Justice Scalia supported this deference to state law with a historical
argument and a reference to his view of the interrelationship between federal
and state laws. 48 Justice Scalia stated that “value” cannot mean fair market value
because that phrase is used in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code, and Congress
specifically avoided the phrase fair market value in 11 U.S.C. § 548, and instead
used “reasonably equivalent value.” 49 Further, Justice Scalia stated that
“[f]raudulent transfer law and foreclosure law enjoyed over 400 years of
peaceful coexistence in Anglo-American jurisprudence until the Fifth Circuit’s
43. 511 U.S. at 535; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). It is important to note that Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion of the Court in BFP, and when he finds ambiguity in statutory text, he “tends to part
from his colleagues in his dismissal of most legislative history.” Janet A. Flaccus, Pre-Petition and
Post-Petition Mortgage Foreclosures and Tax Sales and the Faulty Reasoning of the Supreme
Court, 51 ARK. L. REV. 25, 30 (1998). Instead, Justice Scalia “looks to context in which the law
was passed for guidance. . . . In BFP, he relied on history and interpretative tools to resolve the
ambiguity.” Id. at 30–31.
44. Id. at 31.
45. Id. at 31, 33.
46. Id. at 33 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 540–46).
47. Flaccus, supra note 43, at 33.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 33–34.
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unprecedented 1980 decision in Durrett [v. Washington National Insurance
Company].” 50 Justice Scalia stated that, to the Court’s knowledge, Durrett was
the first instance where fraudulent transfer law was used to set aside a
foreclosure sale. 51
The Court in BFP stated, “to say that the ‘reasonably equivalent value’
language in the fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code requires a
foreclosure sale to yield a certain minimum price beyond what state foreclosure
law requires, is to say, in essence, that the Code has adopted Durrett or Bundles,”
which were Fifth and Seventh Circuit cases, respectively, that held the
foreclosure sales at issue were not for “reasonably equivalent value,” and thus
avoidable. 52 The Court continued, stating that Congress had the constitutional
power “to disrupt the ancient harmony that foreclosure law and fraudulent
conveyance law . . . have heretofore enjoyed. But absent clearer textual guidance
than the phrase ‘reasonably equivalent value’—a phrase entirely compatible
with pre-existing practice—we will not presume such a radical departure.” 53
Moreover, the Court in BFP supported a deference to state law in defining
“value” by arguing that states have a strong interest in preserving real estate
titles. 54 Further, the Court stated that allowing mortgage foreclosure sales to be
avoided would profoundly affect the state interest in preserving real estate titles
by placing property purchased at mortgage foreclosure sales governed by state
law under a federally created cloud. 55 The Court argued that “questions
concerning state land records are fundamental state rights on which only ‘clear
and manifest’ federal statutes can impinge,” and “[b]ecause the word ‘value’ in
section 548 was considered to be ambiguous, it could not meet the ‘clear and
manifest’ standard.” 56 The Court held that
For the reasons described, we decline to read the phrase “reasonably equivalent
value” in § 548(a)(2) to mean, in its application to mortgage foreclosure sales,
either “fair market value” or “fair foreclosure price” (whether calculated as a
percentage of fair market value or otherwise). We deem, as the law has always
deemed, that a fair and proper price, or a “reasonably equivalent value,” for
foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long
as all the requirements of the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with. 57

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

BFP, 511 U.S. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
BFP, 511 U.S. at 544.
Flaccus, supra note 43, at 40–41 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 544).
BFP, 511 U.S. at 545.
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VI. CIRCUIT SPLIT: COURTS ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER TAX SALES
MAY BE AVOIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A.

Extending BFP to Tax Sales
1.

Ninth Circuit: Tracht Gut, LLC v. L.A. County Treasurer & Tax
Collector.

In Tracht Gut, LLC v. L.A. County Treasurer & Tax Collector, the Ninth
Circuit considered whether the rule in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation
should be extended to California tax sales. 58 In Tracht Gut, plaintiff-appellant
Tracht Gut, LLC acquired two properties in 2012, and real property taxes had
not been paid on either property since 2008. 59 The two “properties were thus
‘tax defaulted’ under California state law, and subject to the County’s power to
sell.” 60 “On August 31, 2012, the County served a Notice of Auction for a tax
sale for each of the properties on all interested parties.” 61 Then, “[o]n October
22, 2012, the County Treasurer sold both properties at public auction.” 62 Tracht
Gut filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
on November 27, 2012, which was slightly more than one month after the tax
sales on the properties. 63 Tracht Gut asserted on its Schedule A that
[a] disputed tax sale occurred on or about October 21, 2012. The sales price was
far less than market value of this property. Debtor attempted to pay the taxes in
full, which the [County] refused to take. As of the date of this petition, no Tax
Deed has been recorded and Debtor disputes the validity of the transfer as an
avoidable transfer. 64

Tracht Gut asserted that the tax sales were fraudulent transfers under 11
U.S.C. § 548. 65 Tracht Gut claimed that the properties were not sold for
“reasonably equivalent values” at the tax sales as required by § 548, and thus the
sales should be avoidable. 66 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the rule
in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, “that a prepetition mortgage
foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with state law conclusively established
that the price obtained at that sale was for reasonably equivalent value,” should
also apply to California tax sales because tax foreclosure sales, like the mortgage

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d at 1149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
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foreclosures at issue in BFP, are governed by state law, and have the same
procedural safeguards under California law. 67
The specific procedural safeguards that led to the United States Supreme
Court’s conclusion that mortgage foreclosures would yield “reasonably
equivalent value” in BFP are that “‘[f]oreclosure laws typically require notice
to the defaulting borrower, a substantial lead time before the commencement of
foreclosure proceedings, publication of a notice of sale, and strict adherence to
prescribed bidding rules and auction procedures,’” and the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that California tax sales have all of these procedural safeguards. 68
Under California law, the tax collector may sell tax-defaulted property that
has not been redeemed after the property has been in default for three years for
commercial real estate, and five years for residential real estate, and the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that these time periods provide a “‘substantial lead time.’” 69
California law also requires notices for tax sales comparable to the notices
required under the mortgage foreclosure laws at issue in BFP. 70 Additionally,
California law requires all tax sales to be held at a public auction to the highest
bidder, and that after a tax sale, the tax collector must execute a deed to the
purchaser of the property. 71 Further, California law provides that the tax deed is
“‘conclusive evidence of the regularity of all proceedings from the assessment
of the assessor to the execution of the deed.’” 72 Moreover, “[t]he conclusive
nature of the tax deed establishes that tax sales in California are conducted with
‘strict adherence to prescribed bidding rules and auction procedures.’” 73
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause California tax sales have the
same procedural safeguards as the California mortgage foreclosure sale at issue
in BFP, . . . the price received at a California tax sale conducted in accordance
with state law conclusively establishes ‘reasonably equivalent value’ for
purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).” 74
2.

Tenth Circuit: Kojima v. Grandote Int’l Ltd. Liab. Co. (In re Grandote
Country Club Co.).

In Kojima v. Grandote Int’l Ltd. Liab. Co. (In re Grandote Country Club
Co.), the Tenth Circuit considered an ancillary proceeding to avoid a tax sale

67. Id. at 1152.
68. Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d at 1153 (quoting BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531,
542 (1994)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1153–54.
72. Id. at 1154 (quoting Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 3711).
73. Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d at 1154 (quoting BFP, 511 U.S. at 542).
74. Id.
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brought by the trustee of a Japanese entity involved in a Japanese insolvency. 75
The court found that similar to the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer statute
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 548, “[a] transfer is not fraudulent under CUFTA [(the
Colorado fraudulent transfer statute at issue in this case)] where an asset is
acquired for ‘a reasonably equivalent value’ through a ‘regularly conducted,
non-collusive sale, foreclosing on assets subject to a lien.’” 76
The Tenth Circuit extended BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation to the tax
sale in this case, finding that the tax sale, like the mortgage foreclosure sale in
BFP, “constitutes a transfer ‘for reasonably equivalent value,’ even if the
purchase price was below market value, as long as there is no evidence of
collusion.” 77 Further, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged BFP did not address a tax
sale, however, it stated that BFP had been extended to tax sales in other cases. 78
The Tenth Circuit also stated that other courts had refused to extend BFP to the
tax sale context, including its own Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in
Sherman v. Rose, where the court “refus[ed] to extend BFP to a tax sale
conducted under Wyoming statutes that ‘do not permit a public sale with
competitive bidding.’” 79 The court, however, stated that “the decisive factor in
determining whether a transfer pursuant to a tax sale constitutes ‘reasonably
equivalent value’ is a state’s procedure for tax sales, in particular, statutes
requiring that tax sales take place publicly under a competitive bidding
procedure.” 80 In Grandote, the property was transferred “through a regularly
conducted tax sale under Colorado law subject to a competitive bidding
procedure.” 81 Therefore, “[t]he Tenth Circuit found that the subject transfer
[(through a tax sale)] was not fraudulent under the Colorado fraudulent transfer
statute because the property was acquired through a regularly conducted,
noncollusive sale.” 82
3.

Fifth Circuit: T.F. Stone Co. v. Harper (In re T.F. Stone Co.).

In T.F. Stone Co. v. Harper (In re T.F. Stone Co.), the Fifth Circuit
considered “whether a peppercorn price received in a noncollusive, lawfully
conducted tax foreclosure sale of the real property of a Chapter 11 debtor can
75. Gregg, supra note 41 (citing In re Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d 1146, 1152
(10th Cir. 2001)).
76. Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8104(2) (1991)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Sherman v. Rose (In re Sherman), 223 B.R. 555, 558–59 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
1998)).
80. Id.
81. Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d at 1152 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-11-101
(2007), 39-11-108 (2005)).
82. Gregg, supra note 41 (citing Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d at 1152).
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constitute ‘present fair equivalent value’ within the meaning of § 549(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 549(c).” 83 In T.F. Stone, T.F. Stone Companies,
Inc. acquired title to approximately five acres of land in Bryan County,
Oklahoma. 84 On July 3, 1989, Stone Companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
and listed the Oklahoma property in its schedule of assets at a value of $65,000. 85
Though Stone Companies did not pay ad valorem taxes on the Oklahoma
property in 1989, it did not list Bryan County as a creditor in its bankruptcy, and
it did not file notice of its bankruptcy in Bryan County. 86 On October 1, 1990,
the County Treasurer of Bryan County conducted a tax foreclosure sale of the
property attempting to satisfy Stone Companies’ delinquent tax obligation, as
authorized under Oklahoma law. 87 No bids were made at the tax sale, and as a
result, title to the property transferred to Bryan County. 88 During the two years
after Bryan County took title to the Oklahoma property, Stone Companies had a
right to redeem the Oklahoma property by paying its outstanding tax debt. 89
Stone Companies did not exercise this right, and did not pay taxes on the
property in 1990, 1991, or 1992. 90
On June 4, 1993, Bryan County conducted a tax resale of the property and
sold it for $325, and this was used to satisfy Stone Companies’ delinquent tax
debt. 91 The sale terminated Stone Companies’ redemption right and eliminated
Stone Companies’ remaining equity in the property. 92 On October 21, 1993,
Stone Companies sued in bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 549, seeking to
void the effects of Bryan County’s acquisition of title to the Oklahoma property
and subsequent resale as an unauthorized post-petition transfer. 93
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the county, holding
that the price obtained at the county’s foreclosure sale was presumptively its
present fair equivalent value. 94 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
United States Supreme Court in BFP “expressly eschewed any consideration of
the substantive value received in a forced-sale context and instead pinned the
validity of the transfer on whether the forced sale was non collusive and

83. Matter of T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d 466, 467 (5th Cir. 1995).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Okla. St. Ann. Titl. 68 §§ 3105, 3107 (2019)).
88. T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d at 467.
89. Id. (citing Okla. St. Ann. Titl. 68 § 3113 (2019)).
90. Id. at 467–68.
91. Id. at 468 (citing Okla. St. Ann. Titl. 68 § 3125 (2019) (providing for the resale of
unredeemed properties after the two-year redemption period)).
92. Id.
93. T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d at 468.
94. Marie T. Reilly, A Search for Reason in “Reasonably Equivalent Value” After BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 261, 282–83 (2005).
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conducted in compliance with state law.” 95 Further, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that “Congress may have meant ‘fair equivalent value’ in section 549 to mean
something different than ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in section 548, but the
court could not find a ‘meaningful difference’ between the two phrases,”
supporting its decision to extend BFP in this case. 96 The Fifth Circuit also
supported its extension of BFP to this case by stating that deference should be
given to state regulatory interests, as states have strong interests in ensuring
security of the titles to real estate in mortgage foreclosure sales and tax sales of
real property. 97
B.

Declining to Extend BFP to Tax Sales
1.

Seventh Circuit: Smith v. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith).

“In January 2016, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to rule directly
on the issue of ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in a tax sale where the state tax sale
laws did not include competitive bidding.” 98 In Smith v. SIPI, LLC (In re Smith),
the Seventh Circuit considered “whether compliance with state law for tax sales
is sufficient to establish that the sale was for ‘reasonably equivalent value,’ or
whether the debtor may try to set aside the sale under § 548(a)(1)(B).” 99 The
Seventh Circuit applied the general rule that a sale or other transfer of an
insolvent’s property may be set aside as fraudulent if the transfer was for less
than “reasonably equivalent value” to a lawfully conducted sale of real estate
under Illinois property tax sale procedures. 100
The Seventh Circuit distinguished its holding from the holdings of the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits,
which held that tax sales conducted in compliance with state law establish
reasonably equivalent value for purposes of § 548, noting that the tax sales in
each of those cases were conducted in a similar manner to the foreclosure sale
reviewed in BFP, while the case before it did not include the competitivebidding component found in BFP. 101

Further, in Smith, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit,
concurred with City of Milwaukee v. Gillespie, where the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that “‘a judgment of foreclosure,
based solely upon delinquent taxes in a non-sale foreclosure proceeding, does
95. Id. at 283 (quoting T.F. Stone Co., Inc., 72 F.3d at 470 (emphasis added)).
96. Id. at 283.
97. Id.
98. Frederick F. Rudzik & Kristine H. Rudzik, Seventh Circuit Decision Might Impact State
Property Tax Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 63 (May 2016).
99. 811 F.3d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 2016).
100. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)).
101. Rudzik & Rudzik, supra note 98, at 63.
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not necessarily provide a property owner “reasonably equivalent value” for real
estate without a public sale offering.’” 102 Additionally, in Gillespie, the court
stated, “if property is seized without a sale or competitive bidding, it cannot be
presumed as a matter of law that ‘reasonably equivalent value’ was received by
a debtor transferor because market forces were completely absent.” 103
Furthermore, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Illinois stated that the defendant’s reliance on BFP was
further hampered by the fact that the Illinois real estate tax sale process is not
analogous to the Illinois mortgage foreclosure sale process. Unlike at a mortgage
foreclosure sale, a debtor’s interest in the property is not sold at a tax sale; rather,
only the delinquent taxes are purchased by the winning bidder, not the title to
the property. The court in McKeever v. McClandon (In re McKeever), described
the Illinois tax sale process as follows: “the only purpose of a tax sale is for the
taxing authority to obtain payment of its delinquent taxes at the lowest cost of
redemption. There is no correlation between the sale price and the value of the
property. Therefore, it will be a rare case where the taxes paid at a tax sale will
approximate the actual value of the property.” 104

The court continued, stating “[a]s a result of the Illinois tax statute, competitive
bidding was not present at the time of the transfer to ensure that market forces
were acting efficiently to create a fair value for the property transferred.” 105
Further, the court reasoned that a lack of competitive bidding and other
procedures ensuring a fair value is received for transferred property is “a
significant bar to adjudicating ‘reasonably equivalent value’ in a tax sale
context.” 106 Therefore, the United States Bankruptcy Court found “that BFP
does not bar recovery by the Debtors under section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Code
because the price received at the tax sale does not necessarily reflect a
reasonably equivalent value for the underlying property.” 107
In Smith, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision,
holding that
[u]nlike mortgage foreclosure sales and some other states’ tax sales, Illinois tax
sales do not involve competitive bidding where the highest bid wins. Instead,
bidders bid how little money they are willing to accept in return for payment of
the owner’s delinquent taxes. The lowest bid wins, and the bid amounts bear no
relationship to the value of the underlying real estate. We therefore agree with

102. In re Smith, 501 B.R. 843, 847 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing City of Milwaukee v.
Gillespie, 487 B.R. 916, 920 (E.D. Wis. 2013)).
103. Gillespie, 487 B.R. at 920.
104. Smith, 501 B.R. at 847 (quoting McKeever v. McClandon (In re McKeever), 166 B.R.
648, 650–51 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994)).
105. Smith, 501 B.R. at 847.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the bankruptcy court, disagree with the district court, and apply the general rule
of § 548(a)(1)(B). 108

2.

Second Circuit: Clinton County Treasurer v. Wolinsky.

In Clinton County Treasurer v. Wolinsky, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York considered an appeal arguing “that a valid
pre-petition tax foreclosure proceeding and subsequent transfer of property to a
[bona fide purchaser] is not the type of fraudulent conveyance contemplated by
Bankruptcy Code § 548.” 109 In Wolinsky, the property at issue was transferred
on March 18, 2011 from the debtor to Clinton County through an in rem tax
foreclosure proceeding Clinton County commenced after the debtor failed to pay
$2,406.45 in property taxes in 2008 and 2009, and then failed to answer the
foreclosure petition or pay the delinquent taxes prior to the redemption
deadline. 110 The property value was assessed at $42,000 at the time of
foreclosure. 111 Clinton County then sold the property at a public auction to a
bona fide purchaser for $25,500 in June of 2011. 112 The debtor filed for
bankruptcy on December 20, 2011. 113 The trustee commenced the adversary
proceeding on June 28, 2012 seeking a judgment against Clinton County
declaring the tax foreclosure transfer to be fraudulent and avoiding the transfer
for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 114
Clinton County argued that the tax foreclosure proceeding cannot be
avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). 115 Clinton County further argued
that allowing tax sales to be avoided would “impinge[] upon a municipality’s
right to collect unpaid real property taxes through foreclosure actions.” 116
Instead, the court in Wolinsky reasoned that BFP should not apply to tax sales. 117
The court stated that, in BFP, the United States Supreme Court refrained from
extending its holding to other foreclosures and forced sales, including tax sales
as an example. 118 Additionally, the court in Wolinsky stated that other federal
courts in New York have specifically refused to extend BFP to tax sales because,
according to these courts, mortgage and in rem tax foreclosures are substantially
different, and these differences justify differing treatment pursuant to § 548. 119

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 234.
Clinton Cty. Treasurer v. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. 34, 36 (N.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wolinsky, 511 B.R. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 38.
Wolinsky, 511 B.R. at 38.
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In Wolinsky, the court also reasoned that the language in § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code suggests tax sales can be avoided because the statute states
that “any transfer” that occurred within two years prior to the bankruptcy filing
date may be avoided if the transfer involved actual or constructive fraud. 120 The
court in Wolinsky stated that, based on this language, there is no indication that
Congress intended to carve out an exception for tax sales. 121 The court also
reasoned that permitting avoidance of tax sales “comports with the Bankruptcy
Code’s general policy favoring equal treatment of creditors.” 122 Therefore, the
court in Wolinsky concluded that § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code “permits the
Trustee to avoid ‘any transfer’—including a valid state tax foreclosure
proceeding—that occurred within two years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition and involved actual or constructive fraud.” 123
3.

Second Circuit: In re Wentworth.

In In re Wentworth, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Connecticut considered “whether a non-judicial strict foreclosure of a town tax
lien conducted pursuant to a state law may constitute an avoidable fraudulent
transfer under Bankruptcy Code § 548 where there is a one to thirteen ratio
between the amount of the tax lien and the value of the property.” 124 In
Wentworth, the Town of Acton, Maine filed a tax lien and then obtained title
through the forfeiture procedure to the debtor’s property in Acton prior to the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing date. 125 The plaintiff claimed that Acton’s foreclosure
of its tax lien, when the debtor was insolvent, was an avoidable transfer pursuant
to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code “because the debtor received less than a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer.” 126 The defendant
contended that the transfer of property cannot be avoided because the debtor
received “reasonably equivalent value” through the tax foreclosure
proceeding. 127
Furthermore, the defendant in Wentworth argued that under BFP, the
defendant’s forfeiture procedure provided “reasonably equivalent value.”128 The
court stated that in BFP, the United States Supreme Court held that the
consideration received from a noncollusive mortgage foreclosure sale that
conforms to applicable state law is “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to §
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 39 (citing Cty. of Clinton v. Warehouse at Van Buren St., Inc., 496 B.R. 278, 283
n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2013)).
123. Id. at 41.
124. In re Wentworth, 221 B.R. 316, 317 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 318.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 319.
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548 of the Bankruptcy Code, and emphasized that this decision covered only
mortgage foreclosure sales. 129 Further, the Court in BFP stated that the
considerations may be different in the context of other foreclosures and forced
sales, including tax sales. 130 In Wentworth, the defendant argued that in a
“reasonably equivalent value” analysis, market value is irrelevant and
equivalence must be measured by compliance with state mandated
procedures. 131 The court in Wentworth stated that
[t]he cases that have extended BFP to tax foreclosure sales have generally
compared the protections offered to the property owner under the state’s
mortgage foreclosure and tax foreclosure statutes and found that the property
owner is at least as well protected in a tax foreclosure proceeding as in a
mortgage foreclosure. 132

Moreover, in Wentworth, the court stated “[t]he rationale of the cases
extending BFP to tax foreclosure sales does not apply to the instant matter
because under Maine’s forfeiture procedure for foreclosure of tax liens, the
property was transferred without the possibility of judicial oversight, without
competitive bidding, and without a public sale.” 133 The court in Wentworth
distinguished Maine’s forfeiture procedure at issue in that case from mortgage
foreclosure sales and other tax foreclosure sales, such as the ones in the cases
that extended BFP to tax foreclosure sales, stating that Maine’s forfeiture
procedure eliminates the market while mortgage foreclosure sales and the other
tax foreclosure sales only redefine the market. 134 Further, the court stated,
“[w]hile the forced sale price may be legitimate evidence of the property’s value,
the amount of a tax lien is no evidence whatsoever of the property’s value.” 135
Therefore, the court in Wentworth “conclude[d] that the transfer of a debtor’s
real property with a market value of $20,700 for a tax lien of $1,515.63, pursuant
to the forfeiture procedure, is not for reasonably equivalent value,” and,
“[c]onsequently, the transfer is a fraudulent transfer pursuant to § 548.” 136
VII. THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS CAUSED BY THE LACK OF A UNIVERSALLY
APPLIED STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER TAX SALES ARE FOR
“REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE”
The lack of a universally applied standard to determine whether tax sales are
for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding avoidance pursuant to § 548 of the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Wentworth, 221 B.R. at 319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319–20.
Wentworth, 221 B.R. at 320.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
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Bankruptcy Code causes uncertainty and other negative effects. Allowing tax
sales to be considered not for “reasonably equivalent value,” and as a result,
avoidable, “impinges upon a municipality’s right to collect unpaid real property
taxes through foreclosure actions.” 137 Additionally, allowing tax sales to be
avoidable could “always result in real property tax foreclosures [being] set aside
because [i]nvariably, there will always be a significant disparity between the
amount of taxes due and [the] value of the property itself.” 138 Providing that tax
sales may be avoided significantly harms the tax sale market by making it risky
to acquire property through tax sales. Individuals and entities may stop
attempting to acquire property through tax sales because of the threat that
purchasers could lose their investment if the tax sale is avoided in bankruptcy.
This, as mentioned earlier, may make it difficult for municipalities to collect
unpaid property taxes through tax sales, which is a significant state interest. 139
Moreover, it is unjust to take property away from good faith purchasers who
acquire property through tax sales. These good faith purchasers are acquiring
property through tax sales administered and controlled by state and local
governments, and have no reason to suspect that their purchase may be
“constructively fraudulent” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The fact
that these purchasers are acquiring property from state and local governments
should arguably increase tax sale purchasers’ confidence in the security of the
titles to real estate purchased at tax sales. Therefore, avoiding tax sales unjustly
and unpredictably harms innocent acquirers of property through tax sales.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court recognized the negative
effects and issues that would be caused by holding that mortgage foreclosure
sales controlled by state law are avoidable in BFP, stating
Federal statutes impinging upon important state interests cannot . . . be construed
without regard to the implications of our dual system of government . . . When
the Federal Government takes over . . . local radiations in the vast network of
our national economic enterprise and thereby radically readjusts the balance of
state and national authority, those charged with the duty of legislating must be
reasonably explicit. It is beyond question that an essential state interest is at issue
here: We have said that the general welfare of society is involved in the security
of the titles to real estate and the power to ensure that security inheres in the very
nature of state government. Nor is there any doubt that the interpretation urged
by petitioner [that the mortgage foreclosure at issue should be deemed not for
“reasonably equivalent value,” and as a result, avoidable] would have a profound
effect upon that interest: The title of every piece of realty purchased at
foreclosure would be under a federally created cloud . . . To displace traditional
state regulation in such a manner, the federal statutory purpose must be clear and
137. Clinton Cty. Treasurer v. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. 34, 37 (N.D.N.Y. 2014).
138. Cty. of Clinton v. Warehouse at Van Buren St., Inc., 496 B.R. 278, 281 (N.D.N.Y. 2013)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Wolinsky, 511 B.R. at 37.
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manifest. Otherwise, the Bankruptcy Code will be construed to adopt, rather
than to displace, pre-existing state law. 140

These same interests and issues exist equally in the context of tax sales
controlled by state law. Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code should be construed
to adopt pre-existing state law controlling tax sales because the federal statutory
purpose of avoiding tax sales is not clear and manifest, which is required to
displace traditional state regulation. Therefore, the courts should similarly find
that a fair and proper price, or a “reasonably equivalent value,” for foreclosed
property, including property foreclosed at tax sales, is the price in fact received
at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the state’s foreclosure
law have been complied with, precluding avoidance pursuant to § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 141
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court stated in the above quoted
text from BFP that the general welfare of society is involved in the security of
the titles to real estate, and the Court stated this is an essential interest of
states. 142 Further, the Court continued, providing that the states have the power
to ensure the security of the titles to real estate. 143 The Court acknowledged that
allowing mortgage foreclosure sales to be avoided would profoundly affect that
state interest by placing property purchased at mortgage foreclosure sales
governed by state law “under a federally created cloud.” 144 The same interests
and issues exist with respect to tax sales. This Note argues that allowing tax sales
to be avoided harms the general welfare of society and states’ interests by
significantly reducing the security of the titles to real estate obtained through
lawfully conducted tax sales. Specifically, by avoiding tax sales, the federal
government is taking property away from good faith acquirers of property, and
not allowing the states to ensure the security of the titles to property transferred
through tax sales. Further, the federal government is disregarding state laws
governing tax sales when it deems property acquired through tax sales
“constructively fraudulent” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Avoiding
tax sales is a displacement of traditional state regulation, and this Note argues
this is federal government overreach, and it harms the general welfare of society
and states’ interests by significantly reducing the security of the titles to real
estate obtained through tax sales.

140. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544–45 (1994) (internal citations, alterations,
and quotation marks omitted).
141. See id. at 545.
142. Id. at 544.
143. Id.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
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VIII. SOLUTION: SHOULD BFP APPLY TO TAX SALES?
An ideal solution to resolve the issue of whether tax sales may be avoided
pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code is to apply BFP to tax sales. In BFP,
the United States Supreme Court “expressly noted that BFP did not apply to tax
foreclosures,” and this has created confusion surrounding the issue of whether
tax sales may be avoided pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 145 In BFP,
the Court stated in a footnote that “[w]e emphasize that our opinion today covers
only mortgage foreclosures of real estate. The considerations bearing upon other
foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for example) may be
different.” 146 It is important to highlight that the Court stated the considerations
may be different. 147 This does not mean that the Court would have ruled
differently if BFP involved a tax sale, only that it could have ruled differently. 148
The Court has not ruled on this issue with respect to tax sales, however, and thus
the issue remains unresolved.
This Note argues that the differences between tax sales and mortgage
foreclosure sales do not justify treating these sales differently when considering
whether the sales yield “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. In In re McGrath, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey provided reasoning for why BFP should apply “with as
much force” in the context of tax sales as it does in mortgage foreclosure sales. 149
While some courts have disagreed with this decision, this Note argues the
reasoning and holding in McGrath is correct. The court in McGrath reasoned
that “[a] tax foreclosure is as much a forced sale process as a mortgage
foreclosure.” 150 Further, “the policy considerations favoring deference to
mortgage foreclosure sales apply with as much force to tax foreclosure sales.” 151
Additionally,
[t]he holding in BFP, that reasonably equivalent value for foreclosed property is
the price received at a non-collusive foreclosure sale, is based in large part upon
the premise that “‘the general welfare of society is involved in the security of
the titles to real estate’ and the power to ensure that security ‘inheres in the very
nature of [state] government.’” 152

The Court continued, “not[ing] that foreclosure laws vary from state to state
based upon how each state values the interests of creditors and debtors, and

145. Gregg, supra note 41.
146. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537 n.3 (1994) (emphasis added).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78, 82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 542–44 (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47,
60 (1911))).
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setting a federal ‘reasonable’ foreclosure price would place ‘federal bankruptcy
law well beyond the traditional field of fraudulent transfers.’” 153 The Court
avoided placing “the title of property purchased at foreclosure under a ‘federally
created cloud,’” holding “that reasonably equivalent value was the price paid at
a foreclosure sale provided that all of the requirements of the state’s foreclosure
law have been complied with.” 154
The court in McGrath then conceded that tax sales will likely yield lower
sale prices than mortgage foreclosures “because the amount of taxes due is
usually much less than the amount due on a mortgage.” 155 As a result, “[the]
difference between the fair market value and the forced sale price is going to be
greater with a tax foreclosure than with a mortgage foreclosure.” 156 BFP states
that fair market value is not the value to consider in a forced sale context, and
the McGrath court stated this should be true for tax sales also. 157 Further,
pursuant to New Jersey state law, a tax sale foreclosure is not a fraudulent
transfer. 158 The McGrath court reasoned that
[w]hile the state statutes do not determine whether a transfer is avoidable under
Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2), . . . this confirms the concern expressed in BFP
that the federal courts should not interpret bankruptcy law as to fraudulent
transfers in a manner which differs from state law absent a clear expression of
Congressional intention that the federal courts should do so. 159

Therefore, in McGrath, the court ultimately concluded “that the reasoning
of BFP applies with as much force to tax foreclosures in New Jersey as it does
to mortgage foreclosures,” and that the price paid for the tax sale certificate in
that case was “reasonably equivalent value” for the debtors’ interest in the
property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548. 160
This Note disagrees with the courts that have held that BFP should not apply
in the tax sale context, and that the tax sales in question were not for “reasonably
equivalent value.” These courts are incorrectly comparing the price received at
tax sales to the fair market values of properties to determine if tax sales were for
“reasonably equivalent value.” This is in contrast to the United States Supreme
Court’s reasoning provided in BFP that courts should not “refer to fair market
value as the benchmark against which determination of reasonably equivalent
value is to be measured. In the context of an otherwise lawful mortgage
foreclosure sale of real estate, such reference is in our opinion not consistent

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

McGrath, 170 B.R. at 82 (quoting BFP, 511 U.S. at 540).
Id. (quoting BFP, 511 U.S. at 544).
Id.
Id.
Id.
McGrath, 170 B.R. at 82 (citing N.J.S.A. §§ 25:2-20 to N.J.S.A. § 54:5-87).
Id. at 83 (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at 542–43).
Id.
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with the text of the Bankruptcy Code.” 161 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court
provided that
we decline to read the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” in § 548(a)(2) to
mean, in its application to mortgage foreclosure sales, either “fair market value”
or “fair foreclosure price” (whether calculated as a percentage of fair market
value or otherwise). We deem, as the law has always deemed, that a fair and
proper price, or a “reasonably equivalent value,” for foreclosed property, is the
price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of
the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with. 162

Again, in BFP, the Court restricted this holding to mortgage foreclosures. 163
This Note argues that this reasoning and definition of “reasonably equivalent
value” should apply to tax sales. It is inappropriate to change the definition of
the phrase “reasonably equivalent value” in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
depending on the circumstances because this creates uncertainty and unevenly
applied law. Additionally, the distinction between tax sales and mortgage
foreclosure sales is not significant enough to use different definitions of the
phrase “reasonably equivalent value” for tax sales as compared to mortgage
foreclosure sales. They are both forced sales, and will likely yield lower prices
than fair market value, however, the Court in BFP reasoned that fair market
value is irrelevant when considering whether a mortgage foreclosure sale is for
“reasonably equivalent value.” 164 Therefore, fair market value should be
irrelevant when considering whether tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent
value.” Furthermore, the protections offered to property owners in mortgage
foreclosure sales and tax sales are comparable and generally “the property owner
is at least as well protected in a tax foreclosure proceeding as in a mortgage
foreclosure.” 165 Moreover, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, for example, applied BFP to Missouri tax sales, and
responded to the fair market value issue stating
[t]he Court is sensitive to the fact that most, if not all, forced tax sales yield a
purchase price much lower than the “fair market value” of the property. The
Supreme Court also recognized this fact in the mortgage foreclosure context, yet
it did not control their analysis. Similarly, the consideration received at a tax sale
should not control the analysis in this case. 166

161. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1994).
162. Id. at 545.
163. Id. at 537 n.3.
164. Id. at 536–37.
165. In re Wentworth, 221 B.R. 316, 319 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
166. In re Russell-Polk, 200 B.R. 218, 222 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1996) (citing BFP, 511 U.S. at
538–39).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

CAN TAX SALES BE AVOIDED IN BANKRUPTCY CASES?

511

BFP should apply to tax sales, and as a result, there should be a presumption that
lawfully conducted tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” precluding
avoidance pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, similar to the court in McGrath, this Note argues that BFP should
apply to tax sales. 167 “Tax foreclosure sale statutes are often comparable to
mortgage foreclosure sale statutes,” and as a result, “by analogy, BFP is
arguably applicable to tax foreclosure sales.” 168 Further, the considerations in
BFP involving mortgage foreclosures are analogous to the considerations
involving tax sales. Just as the courts in interpreting § 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code are required to defer to state law governing mortgage foreclosure sales
pursuant to BFP, 169 the courts in interpreting § 548 should be required to defer
to state law governing tax sales. Specifically, the courts should rule that, like in
BFP, a “reasonably equivalent value” for property is the price in fact received
at the forced sale, including tax sales, so long as all the requirements of the
state’s forced sale laws have been complied with. 170
IX. SOLUTION: ADOPTING A PRESUMPTION THAT THE PRICE RECEIVED AT A
TAX SALE PROVIDES FOR “REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE” BASED ON
FOUR ELEMENTS
“In reliance on the BFP holding, some courts have found that the price
received through a tax sale provides for reasonably equivalent value where three
procedural protections are present: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure and
strict adherence to statutory requirements.” 171 Further, “[t]hese courts generally
view BFP as instructing that federal courts should not interpret bankruptcy’s
fraudulent-transfer provisions in a manner that differs from state law, absent a
clear expression of congressional intent.” 172 States generally hold that tax sales
are not subject to their fraudulent conveyance statutes, and as a result,
bankruptcy courts using the fraudulent-conveyance provisions of § 548 should
not reach a different result. 173 These courts reason that “what is a reasonable
price under the provisions of the state statute providing for the forced sale should
be deemed reasonably equivalent value under § 548.” 174 Moreover, “[t]his
method provides tax sales in each state the same protections, and only sales that
do not comply with a state’s statutory requirements may be set aside.” 175

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

In re McGrath, 170 B.R. 78, 83 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).
Gregg, supra note 41.
BFP, 511 U.S. at 545.
See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
Rudzik & Rudzik, supra note 98, at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“Other courts require a fourth element: the need for competitive bidding.” 176
Adding this fourth element creates the potential of differing results depending
on the provisions of the state statute authorizing the sale in question. 177 The
courts requiring the fourth element still rely on BFP. 178 In BFP, the United
States Supreme Court noted that not all forced sales pursuant to state law would
be deemed to be for a “reasonably equivalent value.” 179
These courts look to the facts of BFP, recognizing that the state procedure in
question, as noted by the Supreme Court, provided for competitive bidding. The
bidding allows for a market to establish the value—a value not necessarily
related in any way to “fair market value,” but for a “reasonably equivalent value”
to the debtor’s interest under the circumstances of the forced sale. 180

This Note agrees with the courts that have found that the price received
through a tax sale provides for “reasonably equivalent value” where the
following four procedural protections are present: notice, reasonable opportunity
to cure, strict adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding. 181
This approach is ideal because it addresses the negative effects caused by the
uncertainty under the current system while ensuring that bankruptcy estates
receive a fair value because a tax sale meeting the aforementioned four elements
will likely yield a fair value. Further, adopting this presumption could provide
an additional incentive for states to amend their tax sale procedures to meet the
elements required to establish “reasonably equivalent value” in tax sales. This
could benefit states because their tax sales would presumably yield higher values
if the tax sales meet the aforementioned elements.
Therefore, as some courts have recognized, an ideal solution to address the
negative effects caused by the lack of a universally applied standard to determine
whether tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code is for the courts to adopt a universally applied presumption
that tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” when the tax sale in question
meets the following four elements: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure, strict
adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding. This solution
addresses the negative effects caused by the uncertainty under the current system
while still ensuring that a fair value is received by the bankruptcy estate to be
distributed among creditors of the estate, fulfilling the bankruptcy courts’
mission of “ensuring equal treatment for both debtors and creditors.” 182
176. Rudzik & Rudzik, supra note 98, at 63.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Rudzik & Rudzik, supra note 98, at 63.
182. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Welcome to the
official website for the United States Bankruptcy Court Eastern District of Missouri (last visited
February 10, 2019), https://www.moeb.uscourts.gov [https://perma.cc/2L26-KYK2].
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X. CONCLUSION
Currently, there is no universally applied standard to determine whether tax
sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” pursuant to § 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code. As a result, it remains uncertain and difficult to predict whether tax sales
may or may not be avoided because tax sales may be avoided if they are not for
“reasonably equivalent value.” This uncertainty has numerous negative effects,
including causing harm to the general welfare of society and states’ interests by
significantly reducing the security of the titles to real estate obtained through tax
sales. 183 One solution to address this issue is to apply BFP to tax sales.
Specifically, the courts should rule that, like in BFP, a “reasonably equivalent
value” for property is the price in fact received at forced sales, including tax
sales, so long as all the requirements of the state’s forced sale laws have been
complied with. 184 Another solution is for the courts to adopt a presumption that
tax sales are for “reasonably equivalent value” when the tax sale in question
meets the following four elements: notice, reasonable opportunity to cure, strict
adherence to statutory requirements, and competitive bidding. One of these
solutions is necessary to remove the titles of property purchased at tax sales from
under the current “federally created cloud.” 185
ZACHARY W. LANGREHR *

183. See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994).
184. Id. at 545; 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
185. BFP, 511 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added).
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